打造 AI Agent 零信任 Egress 防線
English Abstract: Putting real API keys into the environment variables of AI agent containers is unsafe. An agent that can run shell commands can read them from /proc/self/environ, leak them through DNS queries, or expose them through a .env file. This article builds a zero-trust egress layer: an internal-only Docker network with no external route, plus an egress proxy that holds the real keys and swaps a phantom token for them only on allowlisted domains. It includes a runnable Docker Compose and mitmproxy setup, and extends the design into an enterprise AI gateway for key rotation, budget circuit breaking, and audit logging. 本文重點大綱 架構觀念翻轉 :在微服務時代,The Twelve-Factor App 提倡將設定與憑證存入環境變數(Environment Variables);但在具備 Shell 執行權限與自主控制迴圈(Control Loop)的 AI Agent 時代,將真實 API Key 放進容器環境變數等同於將機密公開。 三大真實攻擊向量與 CVE 佐證 :深入剖析失控或遭受間接提示詞注入(Indirect Prompt Injection)的 AI Agent,如何繞過指令黑名單,透過 Linux /proc/self/environ 跨行程繼承 、 DNS 隧道(DNS Exfiltration,以 CVE-2025-55284 為例) 與 .env 渲染漏洞 竊取憑證。 視覺化網路拓撲與時序拆解 ...